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Keith: Dicamba is Gone with the Wind: The Ninth Circuit Blows Life into

DICAMBA IS GONE WITH THE WIND: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLOWS LIFE INTO FIFRA IN NATIONAL FAMILY
FARM COALITION V. UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
I. THE TEMPEST: AN INTRODUCTION

TO

FIFRA

AND

DICAMBA

Soybean farmers, an integral part of the United States economy, planted eighty-three million acres of crops in 2020 worth approximately forty-six billion dollars.1 These economic incentives
are not for the faint of heart; farmers face threats from various
sources such as weeds, pests, and disease, but a new threat is rising
— over-the-top (OTT) dicamba use.2 For decades, farmers have
used the pesticide dicamba, which is characterized by both its effectiveness and volatility.3 Because of dicamba’s volatility — which describes a chemical’s ability to vaporize into the atmosphere and
drift off target — farmers generally did not use it during growing
seasons.4 Instead, farmers sprayed traditional dicamba on weeds
prior to soybean growth rather than directly onto the soybeans.5 In
dicamba’s place, herbicides such as Roundup dominated the marketplace, eventually leading to herbicide-resistant weeds.6 In re1. See Related Data & Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RSCH. SERV., https:/
/www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/related-data-statistics/https:/
/www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/related-data-statistics/ (Oct.
18, 2021) (estimating amount and worth of soybeans planted). The Department
of Agriculture estimates soybean use will increase to ninety million acres in 2021.
Id. (extrapolating 2021 soybean growth).
2. Harold Willis, How to Solve Common Soybean Problems, ECO FARMING DAILY,
https://www.ecofarmingdaily.com/grow-crops/grow-soybeans/soybean-diseasesweeds-and-pests/how-to-solve-common-soybean-problems/ (last visited Sept. 3,
2021) (summarizing threats to soybean growth). Additional threats to soybean maturity include nutrient deficiencies, deficient root nodules, and fungus growth.
Id. (listing additional problems relating to soybeans).
3. See Bob Hartzler, Dicamba: Past, Present, and Future, IOWA ST. UNIV.: INTEGRATED CROP MGMT. (Dec. 27, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://crops.extension.iastate.
edu/blog/bob-hartzler/dicamba-past-present-and-future (describing dicamba’s
characteristics). Soybeans are extremely sensitive to dicamba; if left unprotected,
only 0.005 percent of dicamba’s standard use can begin to damage the plant. Id.
(identifying soybeans’ susceptibility to dicamba). For a further explanation of how
dicamba drift occurs, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
4. See Carey Gillam, Dicamba Fact Sheet, U.S. RIGHT TO KNOW (June 12, 2020),
https://usrtk.org/pesticides/dicamba/ (noting dicamba’s previously limited use).
5. See id. (explaining traditional use of dicamba prior to OTT use).
6. Id. (observing increase in herbicide-resistant weeds). By 2008, about
ninety-two percent of all soybeans grown in the United States used seeds specifically designed to resist Roundup-style herbicides. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S.
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sponse to the growing problem of herbicide-resistant weeds, the
agricultural industry developed a new form of dicamba and dicamba-resistant soybean seeds.7
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) mandates registration of pesticides by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) before they can be sold in the United
States.8 The EPA granted the conditional registration of novel
OTT dicamba use in 2016 for a limited two-year period.9 Conditional registration allows the EPA to authorize additional uses of a
previously registered pesticide if “(i) the applicant has submitted
satisfactory data pertaining to the proposed additional use, and (ii)
amending the registration in the manner proposed by the applicant
would not significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effect on the environment.”10 Immediately after the registration of OTT dicamba, complaints of soybean damage
skyrocketed.11 The damage OTT dicamba caused is chiefly due to
its high volatility, which allows the herbicide to drift onto neighboring farms and damage unsuspecting crops.12 As the threat and
damage of OTT dicamba continued to grow, environmental advocates sued the EPA alleging the Agency improperly registered the
OTT use under FIFRA.13
Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding nearly unanimous
use of herbicide-resistant soybean seeds).
7. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1125-26 (outlining history of OTT dicamba development).
8. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (mandating registration of herbicides).
9. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-OPP-2016-0187-0959, FINAL REGISTRATION OF DICAMBA ON DICAMBA-TOLERANT COTTON AND SOYBEAN (Nov. 9, 2016)
[hereinafter FIRST DICAMBA REGISTRATION] (granting conditional registration to
OTT dicamba for two years).
10. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(B) (describing required elements for conditional
registration).
11. Dan Charles, Pesticide Police, Overwhelmed by Dicamba Complaints, Ask EPA for
Help, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 6, 2020, 7:19 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2020/02/06/800397488/pesticide-police-overwhelmed-by-dicamba-complaints-ask-epa-for-help (finding increased reports of dicamba damage). In 2017,
OTT dicamba damaged 3.6 million acres of soybean crops. Johnathan Hettinger,
Despite Federal, State Efforts, Dicamba Complaints Continue, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Aug. 27, 2019), https://investigatemidwest.org/2019/08/27/
despite-federal-state-efforts-dicamba-complaints-continue/ (reporting extent of dicamba damage).
12. Charles, supra note 11 (reporting dicamba drift causes soybean damage).
Soybeans are not the only plant OTT dicamba drift affects; vineyards and orchards
have also reported crop damage. Id. (asserting scope of OTT dicamba damage is
not limited to soybeans).
13. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1124 (explaining causes of action against
EPA).
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This Note examines the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in National
Family Farm Coalition v. United States Environmental Protection Agency14
and its impact on the statutory requirements of conditional registrations under FIFRA.15 Part II provides the facts of the case.16 Part
III discusses the statutory background and structure of FIFRA and
how the Ninth Circuit has interpreted and applied the statute to
similar challenges.17 Part IV summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in holding the OTT dicamba registration improper.18 Part V
challenges the Ninth Circuit’s decision to forego making a declaratory statement regarding whether the EPA supplied satisfactory
data.19 Finally, Part VI assesses the potential impact of National
Family Farm Coalition on future FIFRA litigation.20
II. EARTH, WIND,

AND

FIRE: THE FACTS
COALITION

OF

NATIONAL FAMILY FARM

As the effectiveness of herbicides like Roundup waned, manufacturers created dicamba products designed for users to spray directly over crops.21 The development of OTT dicamba alarmed
scientists and advocates because of the chemical’s tendency to drift
off target due to its innate chemical characteristics.22 Despite this
alarm, agrochemical companies successfully registered the new
14. 960 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2020) (reviewing conditional registration of
OTT dicamba).
15. For a discussion of National Family Farm Coalition’s potential impact on
future FIFRA claims for conditional registrations, see infra notes 212-29 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of National Family Farm
Coalition, see infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the legal background of FIFRA and National Family
Farm Coalition, see infra notes 41-81 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of how the Ninth Circuit came to its conclusion in National Family Farm Coalition, see infra notes 82-178 and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in National Family Farm Coalition, see infra notes 179-29 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the potential impact of National Family Farm Coalition,
see infra notes 203-29 and accompanying text.
21. See Petitioner’s Opening Brief (Redacted) at 3-4, Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v.
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-70115), 2019 WL
3975855, at *3-4 (describing creation of OTT dicamba).
22. Id. at *5 (warning of potential dicamba drift damage). At high temperatures and low humidity, dicamba particles vaporize into the atmosphere, allowing
drift to occur. Chris Boerboom, Dicamba and Soybeans: A Controversial Combo, IOWA
STATE UNIV. PROC. OF THE INTEGRATED CROP MGMT. CONF. 54 (Dec. 1, 2009),
https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7615c0f7-1b7f-4966-ae4c0c6f565b4105/content (describing mechanics of dicamba vaporization and drift
factors).
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OTT use of dicamba with the EPA in 2016.23 In its approval letter,
the EPA granted registration based on the belief that the new dicamba products had a lower volatility risk than previously-registered
dicamba.24 Additionally, to minimize the risk of dicamba drift, the
EPA placed limitations on the spraying methods for OTT
dicamba.25
In January 2017, the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC)
filed suit against the EPA for granting the 2016 conditional registration.26 Before the Ninth Circuit reached a decision on the merits,
the EPA in 2018 announced its decision to extend the registration
for an additional two-year term.27 Because the 2016 registration
was no longer in effect, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as
moot.28 The court did, however, determine that if the 2018 registration was challenged, it would expedite review of the case.29
In January 2019, the NFFC filed a new petition challenging the
2018 extension of OTT dicamba use.30 The EPA acknowledged reports of dicamba damage since the 2016 registration, but found
there was “a lack of scientific consensus regarding the cause of
these reported incidents.”31 Despite the disagreement surrounding
the reported damage, the EPA attempted to mitigate fears of OTT
dicamba damage by adding additional labeling requirements to
23. FIRST DICAMBA REGISTRATION, supra note 9 (approving conditional registration for OTT dicamba).
24. Id. at 2 (citing lower potential of volatility and drift as reasons for
approval).
25. Id. at 31-33 (adding use limitations to label). Label specifications control
when farmers can spray dicamba and include specifications on temperature, wind
speeds, spray height, and buffer zones. Id. (describing label requirements).
26. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 747 F. App’x 646, 647
(9th Cir. 2017) (describing initial suit brought against EPA).
27. Id. (noting EPA renewed registration for additional two-year term).
28. Id. at 647-48 (dismissing case because 2016 registration was no longer
effective).
29. Id. at 648 (ordering Clerk of Courts to set “expedited” briefing and argument if applicable).
30. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th
Cir. 2020) (granting review of 2018 registration); see U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
EPA-HQ-OPP-2016-0187-0968, REGISTRATION DECISION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF
USES OF DICAMBA ON DICAMBA TOLERANT COTTON AND SOYBEAN 3 (Oct. 31, 2018)
[hereinafter FINAL DICAMBA REGISTRATION DECISION] (describing continuation of
OTT dicamba registration).
31. FINAL DICAMBA REGISTRATION DECISION, supra note 30, at 5 (concluding
dicamba use did not cause damage). The EPA also acknowledged the number of
complaints regarding dicamba drift tripled in 2017 and doubled in 2018 compared
to pre-registration; however, the EPA still concluded the benefits of registration
outweighed the risks. Id. at 10-11, 18 (reporting number of complaints received
per year regarding dicamba drift damage).
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OTT dicamba products.32 The new requirements included restricting the time of day when OTT dicamba can be applied, requiring
OTT application within forty-five days of planting, and expanding
the spraying buffer zones.33
The NFFC’s petition alleged the EPA violated FIFRA and the
Endangered Species Act when granting the 2018 conditional registration.34 The NFFC asserted the EPA did not use enough data
when making its conditional registration decision and failed to consider additional data produced since the 2016 registration.35 In response, the EPA argued the 2018 registration is supported by
sufficient data under FIFRA and, even if the court concluded otherwise, it should remand without vacatur, leaving the registration in
effect.36
Under FIFRA, an EPA registration decision is upheld if there is
“substantial evidence” to support the decision.37 The Ninth Circuit
did not assess the quality of the EPA data, but the court did hold
there was not “substantial evidence” to support the EPA’s claim that
the environment would not be adversely affected by OTT dicamba.38 Specifically, the court found the EPA either severely underestimated risks or failed to acknowledge them altogether.39
Finally, the Ninth Circuit decided against remanding without vacatur, vacating the registration.40

32. Id. at 3, 19-22 (requiring additional labeling).
33. Id. at 22 (summarizing new label and use requirements).
34. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1124 (stating grounds of NFFC’s claims).
Because the court held that the registration violated FIFRA, it did not consider
whether a violation of the Endangered Species Act occurred. Id. at 1125 (declining to review Endangered Species Act).
35. Petitioner’s Opening Brief (Redacted), supra note 21, at *14-36 (summarizing alleged FIFRA violations by EPA).
36. Brief of U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency et al., Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-70115), 2019 WL 5396733, at
*23 (announcing EPA’s argument in relation to FIFRA claim); Nat’l Fam. Farm
Coal, 960 F.3d at 1144 (requesting court keep registration active despite FIFRA
violation). The EPA also argued for a restricted scope of review in which the court
would only examine the registration of ExtendiMax; however, the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument primarily because the 2018 registration named all three
pesticides and the EPA’s risk assessment covered OTT dicamba use generally. Id.
at 1132 (rejecting EPA’s request for narrow scope of review).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (determining judicial standard of review for FIFRA
claims).
38. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135-36 (summarizing Ninth Circuit’s
holding).
39. Id. at 1136 (finding EPA failed to use substantial evidence).
40. Id. at 1145 (determining appropriate remedy is to vacate registration).
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III. WUTHERING HEIGHTS: THE BACKGROUND OF FIFRA, PESTICIDE
REGISTRATION, AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
To understand the issues surrounding National Family Farm Coalition, it is important to outline FIFRA’s statutory text, registration
methods, and relevant case law.41 This section begins with an overview of FIFRA and the role of conditional registrations within the
EPA’s pesticide approval process.42 Next, this section examines two
recent Ninth Circuit cases to determine how recent courts have interpreted FIFRA.43
A. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Congress enacted FIFRA in 1947, requiring the U.S. Department of Agriculture to oversee the registration and labeling of
products falling under its review.44 In 1972, Congress amended the
Act, resulting in the EPA gaining jurisdiction over FIFRA registrations.45 Congress updated FIFRA again in 1978, giving the EPA the
ability to grant conditional registrations.46
To distribute and sell a pesticide in the United States, FIFRA
requires the EPA to first register the pesticide.47 The definition of
pesticides under FIFRA includes herbicides: “any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant,
or desiccant.”48 The registration process aims to regulate pesticides
to avoid “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”49 Unreasonable adverse effects are defined in two ways: “(1) [A]ny unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use
41. For a discussion of the judicial and legislative background of National Family Farm Coalition, see infra notes 44-81 and accompanying text.
42. For a review of FIFRA and how it affects the registration of herbicides, see
infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of recent case law examining FIFRA registrations, see infra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
44. Joanna Lau, Comment, Nothing But Unconditional Love for Conditional Registrations: The Conditional Registrations Loophole in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 44 LEWIS & CLARK ENV’T L.R. 1177, 1180 (2014) (outlining history
of FIFRA).
45. Sanne H. Knudson, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313,
2377 (2017) (reviewing legislative changes to FIFRA).
46. Lau, supra note 44, at 1182 (describing FIFRA amendment affecting EPA
registration). The amendment added § 136a(c)(7) in its entirety to FIFRA.
FIFRA, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978) (updating FIFRA to allow conditional registrations).
47. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (requiring registration of pesticides).
48. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (defining pesticides).
49. § 136a(a) (describing scope and purpose of registration process).
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of any pesticide or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from the use of a pesticide. . . .”50
There are two different types of registrations agrochemical
companies can apply for to obtain permission to sell their products:
nonconditional and conditional registration.51 For nonconditional
registrations, applicants must submit a statement describing the
product’s chemical makeup and its uses.52 In addition, FIFRA requires applicants to submit extensive data in support of its claims.53
FIFRA itself does not define the type of data to be submitted; instead, “[t]he [EPA] Administrator shall publish guidelines specifying the kinds of information which will be required to support the
registration of a pesticide. . . .”54 Finally, registration is only
granted to a product if “it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”55
FIFRA allows conditional registration under three different circumstances: (1) the pesticide under review is “identical or substantially similar to any currently registered pesticide”; (2) the
registration adds additional uses to an existing product; or (3) to
register a new active ingredient.56 The standard of review for new
additional uses requires that “the applicant has submitted satisfactory data pertaining to the proposed additional use” and the approval will not “significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable
adverse effect on the environment.”57 The EPA still requires data
submission for conditional registrations, but not to the same extent
as nonconditional registrations.58
Congress intended the EPA to issue conditional registrations
sparingly.59 Today, however, the majority of pesticides registered
50. § 136(bb) (defining unreasonable adverse effects).
51. § 136a(c)(1)-(6) (declaring procedures of nonconditional registration);
§ 136a(c)(7) (creating conditional registrations).
52. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(A) (mandating detailed description of pesticide in application). The statement will also include proposed labeling and the pesticide’s directions for use. § 136(c)(1)(C) (providing additional requirements).
53. § 136a(c)(2) (requiring applicants to submit data for registration).
54. Id. (leaving data requirements undefined).
55. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C) (establishing elements of successful registration).
56. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A)-(C) (stipulating which products can obtain conditional registrations).
57. Id. § 136a(c)(7)(B) (providing standard of review).
58. Id. (granting applicants conditional registrations even when there is less
data available to submit). Applicants who do not have the required data at the
time of submission must update the EPA once the data becomes available. Id.
(directing applicants to continue data collection).
59. See Lau, supra note 44, at 1184 (arguing legislative intent of FIFRA was
against widespread use of conditional registrations).
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with the EPA are conditional registrations, and there is a lack of
oversight over the program.60 A Government Accountability Office
report found that although the number is most likely inflated, “of
16,156 active pesticide registrations. . . 11,205 (69 percent) of these
pesticides were conditionally registered.”61 Further, the report
found that the EPA has no system in place to ensure new data is
submitted pursuant to FIFRA’s requirements.62
B. Pollinator Stewardship Council v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency
In Pollinator Stewardship Council v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,63 the petitioners challenged the EPA’s substantive
review of pesticide registrations.64 In Pollinator, a group of beekeepers and advocates brought suit against the EPA for the registration
of sulfoxaflor, a chemical known to be toxic to honeybees.65 Due to
the environmental risks honey bees face, the EPA evaluated the
risks associated with sulfoxaflor under a new risk assessment.66 Ultimately, the EPA granted registration of sulfoxaflor, which the petitioners argued was made without substantial evidentiary support.67
The Ninth Circuit vacated the registration of sulfoxaflor.68
When evaluating the data for registration, the EPA admitted the
60. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-145, PESTICIDES: EPA
SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF CONDITIONAL REGISTRATIONS 13,
19 (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-145.pdf
(investigating conditional registrations).
61. Id. (reviewing number of registered pesticides). This number is likely inflated for two reasons: (1) the registration status cannot be changed within the
system even if the required data is received, and (2) EPA staff incorrectly identified
some applicants as conditional even when their applications fell outside the purview of § 136a(c)(7). Id. at 13-14 (finding systemic reasons why conditional registration estimate may be high).
62. Id. at 19 (criticizing EPA’s lack of oversight regarding additional data
submissions).
63. 806 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 2015) (reviewing EPA registration of
sulfoxaflor).
64. Id. at 528 (asserting no substantial evidence supported EPA’s decision to
support registering sulfoxaflor).
65. Id. at 522 (establishing parties and issues).
66. Id. at 524-26 (explaining how EPA evaluated data concerning sulfoxaflor).
The risk assessment was a multi-tiered system in which the first tier would determine if potential risks existed, and the second and third tier would refine and add
specificity to the risks if present. Id. (detailing levels of review).
67. Id. at 527-28 (granting registration to sulfoxaflor). The EPA originally
proposed a conditional registration, but later changed course and unconditionally
registered sulfoxaflor even though no additional data was submitted to the EPA.
Id. (noting inconsistency of EPA’s decision to register sulfoxaflor).
68. Pollinator, 806 F.3d. at 533 (holding EPA’s registration was not supported
by substantial evidence).
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testing did not coincide with the chemical’s proposed intended
use.69 In fact, the tests evaluating the biological effects of sulfoxaflor on honeybees used concentration rates of the active ingredient far lower than the proposed use.70 In vacating the registration,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA’s view that because the data was
inconclusive, “the studies affirmatively prove that sulfoxaflor does
not cause unreasonable adverse effects to the bees.”71
C. National Resource Defense Team v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency
National Resource Defense Team v. United States Environmental Protection Agency72 also challenged the EPA’s review of conditional registrations.73 The petitioners challenged the conditional
registration of the pesticide NSPW-L30SS (NSPW), which uses nanosilver as its active ingredient.74 Because nanosilver was a new active ingredient, FIFRA dictates that approval of the pesticide must
also “be in the public’s interest.”75 The EPA asserted its approval of
NSPW registration, stating the registration was “in the public interest” because NSPW’s application rate is lower and it has a lesser
mobility rate.76 In response, plaintiffs argued that substantial evidence did not exist to support those claims.77
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that although the EPA
had substantial evidence showing NSPW’s decreased application
and mobility rate, the court did not have a sufficient basis for deter69. Id. at 526 (observing EPA’s self-assessment of data).
70. Id. at 526, 528-32 (describing limitations of testing provided to EPA). The
maximum proposed concentration of active ingredient was 0.133 pounds per acre;
however, all but one study used concentrations between 0.006 and 0.088 per acre.
Id. (identifying oversights in testing data).
71. Id. at 531 (emphasis in original) (rejecting EPA’s basis for valid
registration).
72. 857 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2017) (challenging nanosilver registration).
73. Nat’l Res. Def. Team v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 857 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2017) (litigating conditional registration of pesticide containing nanosilver);
see also § 136a(c)(7)(C) (allowing conditional registration for new active
ingredients).
74. Nat’l Res. Def. Team, 857 F.3d at 1034 (describing pesticide under review).
Silver has inherent antimicrobial properties and NSPW incorporated the element,
engineered to have a smaller particle size, for use in various plastics and textiles.
Id. (discussing use of silver as pesticide).
75. § 136a(c)(7)(C) (requiring additional public interest requirement).
76. Nat’l Res. Def. Team, 857 F.3d at 1038 (summarizing EPA’s explanation for
registration). A pesticide’s application rate relates to the amount of active ingredients present, whereas its mobility is the amount of a particular substance released
into the external environment. Id. (explaining EPA findings).
77. Id. (clarifying scope of petitioners’ challenge).
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mining that the registration would benefit the public interest.78
The EPA had based its public interest findings on two assumptions:
(1) the free market will replace similar silver pesticides with NSPW,
and (2) the increased use of NSPW will not increase the total
amount of silver exposed to the environment.79 The court determined the EPA did not base either of these assumptions on specific
evidence found in the record.80 Finally, the court held the “public
interest” requirement to be a stricter test because it requires a showing that the pesticide is in the public interest before it can be conditionally registered.81
IV. THE WINDS OF WINTER: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S REBUKE OF DICAMBA’S REGISTRATION
In National Family Farm Coalition, the Ninth Circuit examined
the EPA’s 2018 registration of three OTT dicamba products: ExtendiMax, FeXapan, and Engenia.82 Petitioners challenged the
2018 registration on two grounds — violation of FIFRA and the Endangered Species Act.83 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the two requirements for conditional registration, which include (1)
satisfactory data, and (2) no significant increase in the risk of unreasonable adverse events.84
A. Satisfactory Data
The Ninth Circuit began by examining whether substantial evidence supported the EPA’s contention that the applicants submitted satisfactory data.85 When registering the OTT dicamba
products, the EPA used data including field studies from both the
78. Id. at 1038-42 (discussing case holding).
79. Id. at 1039 (stating EPA’s public interest explanation).
80. Id. at 1040 (rejecting assumptions made by EPA in support of registration). The court took issue with the EPA’s assumption that NSPW use would increase while simultaneously rejecting the possibility of an aggregate increase in
silver exposure. Id. at 1139-40 (identifying inconsistency in EPA assumptions).
81. Nat’l Res. Def. Team, 857 F.3d at 1041-42 (declining EPA’s position that
even potential benefits to public interest are sufficient).
82. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2020) (determining scope of review); see also FINAL DICAMBA REGISTRATION DECISION, supra note 30 (registering three separate OTT dicamba products).
83. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1124 (summarizing challenges against
EPA).
84. Id. at 1133 (determining standard of review). For a discussion of the statutory guidelines creating the standard of review for FIFRA challenges against conditional registrations, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
85. Id. (beginning review by evaluating data submitted for conditional
registration).
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applicant and academia and incident reports.86 The court assumed
these items qualified as “data” and only reviewed their quality.87
1. Field Studies
In support of the OTT dicamba registration, Monsanto, the
manufacturer of ExtendiMax, submitted several field studies.88
When granting the 2018 registration, the EPA considered the studies submitted in support of both the 2016 and 2018 registrations.89
These studies were designed to test the volatility of OTT dicamba.90
The Ninth Circuit first examined the studies submitted in the
original 2016 registration decision.91 Monsanto conducted its own
independent studies for its application.92 These studies, conducted
on fields less than ten acres in size, compared the new OTT dicamba formulation’s volatility to older formulations.93 Monsanto
regarded these studies as the gold standard of volatility testing,
claiming they “tested real-world volatility potential.”94 Initially, the
EPA agreed and accepted these studies when granting the 2016 registration.95 The Ninth Circuit, however, criticized the EPA’s reliance on these studies because it understated volatility risks, and the
EPA later acknowledged its conclusions regarding the studies were
inaccurate.96
The 2018 registration relied on the studies described above
and included five additional Monsanto-derived studies.97 Monsanto
expanded the physical size of the studies; four of the studies were
86. Id. (identifying data used by EPA).
87. Id. (accepting EPA’s conclusion that submitted reports and studies are
“data”).
88. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1133-35 (reporting studies used by EPA
for conditional registration).
89. Id. at 1133 (examining studies submitted to EPA).
90. Id. at 1134 (stating purpose of studies). For a discussion of dicamba’s
volatility, see supra notes 4, 12, 22 and accompanying text.
91. Id. (examining 2016 registration studies).
92. Id. (noting independent nature of studies). At that time, Monsanto did
not allow third parties to use its OTT dicamba product to perform independent
studies. Id. (finding Monsanto did not share OTT dicamba product or chemical
formula for third party independent studies).
93. Nat’l Fam Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1134 (stating parameters of original
studies).
94. Id. (mentioning Monsanto’s remarks on volatility of submitted studies).
95. Id. (accepting studies to grant 2016 conditional registration).
96. Id. (explaining court’s hesitancy in accepting Monsanto studies). The
court found the 2016 studies to be unreliable because millions of acres of dicamba
damage were reported, contrary to the studies’ findings. Id. at 1135 (questioning
results of 2016 studies).
97. Id. at 1135 (showing additional studies were submitted).
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on fields between four and thirty-seven acres and one study was conducted on a one-hundred-acre farm.98 The goal of the additional
studies was to measure the amount of volatility and compare it to
the 2016 results.99 Despite these efforts, the Ninth Circuit was apprehensive in accepting the results of the additional studies because
they sought to confirm the 2016 studies, which the court determined were inadequate.100 Additionally, unlike the 2016 registration, the EPA reviewed third-party studies on OTT dicamba use
when granting the 2018 conditional registration.101 Various universities conducted studies to evaluate the “spray drift and volatility of
dicamba” on fields between ten and forty acres.102 Instead of confirming the EPA’s conclusion, the court found these studies showed
the new OTT dicamba formulations “result[ed] in visible injury to
plants.”103
2. Incident Reports
The EPA also relied on Monsanto’s conclusion regarding incident reports.104 After the 2016 registration, Monsanto received
1,002 reports of dicamba drift damage by July 2017 and an additional 468 reports by July 2018.105 Monsanto reviewed 450 of these
reports and found that its OTT dicamba product “caused few if any
incidents of off-target movement.”106 Monsanto concluded older
formulations of dicamba used on adjacent corn fields were more
likely to blame rather than OTT use.107 The Ninth Circuit firmly
rejected this argument, stating “[t]his explanation, however, is not
supported by the data.”108
98. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135 (recognizing larger scope of 2018
studies).
99. Id. at 1134 (explaining purpose of Monsanto’s 2018 studies).
100. See id. at 1135 (questioning EPA’s use of Monsanto’s studies). The court
was skeptical of accepting studies confirming the 2016 results because large
amounts of OTT dicamba drift damage occurred after these studies hypothesized
drift damage would not occur. Id. (explaining skepticism about testing). For a
discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s critique of the 2016 studies, see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
101. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135 (reviewing field studies created by
independent sources).
102. Id. (reporting use of outside testing for 2018 conditional registration
application).
103. Id. (finding university studies weigh against registration).
104. See id. (identifying other evidence EPA relied on for 2018 registration).
105. Id. at 1134-35 (quantifying number of reports Monsanto received).
106. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135 (emphasis removed) (quoting
Monsanto’s internal conclusions on drift damage).
107. Id. (summarizing Monsanto’s denial of OTT dicamba damage).
108. Id. (rejecting Monsanto’s explanation of dicamba damage).
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The court identified several reasons why the data did not support Monsanto’s conclusions.109 First, the older formulation of dicamba had been used for years and complaints of drift damage
were routinely low.110 The court questioned why Monsanto was unable or unwilling to explain the sudden spike in dicamba complaints after the 2016 registration.111 Second, the court identified a
2014 report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture demonstrating
the use of dicamba by corn farmers has been steadily decreasing.112
If corn farmers’ dicamba use was to blame, this data would suggest
that dicamba complaints would have decreased in correlation with
the decrease in use by corn farmers.113 Finally, the court grappled
with Monsanto’s claim that “because of the increased publicity surrounding the new dicamba formulations,” farmers were noticing
damage that had been present for years.114 Monsanto could not
produce any evidence to support that statement, resulting in the
claim’s rejection.115 Furthermore, there was no evidence that Monsanto attempted to confirm this theory by reaching out to the farmers complaining of drift damage.116
3. Conclusion on Satisfactory Data
The Ninth Circuit admitted that “the data ha[d] several
flaws.”117 The court considered the data presented to the EPA for
the 2018 registration was Monsanto’s attempt to confirm the data
supporting the 2016 registration.118 Additionally, the court was
aware that following the 2016 registration, farmers reported millions of acres of dicamba damage.119 Despite these issues, the
Ninth Circuit held it “need not decide whether substantial evidence
109. Id. (discovering multiple inconsistencies with Monsanto’s report).
110. Id. (discussing low complaints prior to OTT dicamba registration).
111. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135 (examining Monsanto’s lack of
explanation over spike in reports).
112. Id. (presenting Department of Agriculture data). By 2012, dicamba use
amongst corn growers had dropped to twelve percent, creating disbelief that they
were behind the sudden spike in dicamba complaints. Id. (reporting extent of
dicamba use by maize farmers).
113. See id. (questioning whether dicamba use from corn farmers could cause
increase in complaints).
114. Id. (evaluating Monsanto’s explanation on increase of complaints).
115. Id. (observing Monsanto produced no evidence to support its claims).
116. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1135 (determining Monsanto made no
attempt to substantiate its claim).
117. Id. at 1124 (finding data submitted was flawed).
118. Id. at 1135 (framing use of 2018 registration data).
119. Id. (doubting relevance of confirmatory data when 2016 registration resulted in large scale crop damage).
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supports the EPA’s conclusion” because it found that OTT dicamba
use failed the second FIFRA requirement of no significant increase
in unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.120
B. Unreasonable Adverse Effects on the Environment
After reviewing the data presented to the EPA, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the EPA had sufficiently evaluated the potential environmental risks.121 To grant conditional registration of
a pesticide, the EPA must find that the registration “would not significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable effect on the environment” by “taking into account the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits.”122 The Ninth Circuit found that
the EPA erred in two ways: by understating acknowledged risks and
by failing to identify other risks.123 The court ultimately held the
EPA had violated FIFRA and revoked the registration because of
these errors.124
1. Understatement of Risks
In its analysis, the court examined the EPA’s registration decision to determine if it took all adverse effects into account.125 The
EPA identified risks to non-dicamba-tolerant soybeans, dicamba
sensitive crops, and “landscape” risks.126 The Ninth Circuit, however, identified three areas of risks the EPA understated: (1) the
amount of dicamba tolerant (DT) seeds planted; (2) accuracy of
dicamba damage reporting; and (3) refusal to quantify damage.127
As the amount of farmers planting DT soybeans increases, so
too does the use of OTT dicamba because DT soybeans are immune to the pesticide’s effects.128 The EPA relied on Monsanto’s
120. Id. (deciding against making holding on sufficiency of data). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the second FIRA requirement, see infra
notes 121-72 and accompanying text.
121. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1136 (beginning analysis of second
FIFRA requirement).
122. Id. (quoting FIFRA for standard of review). For a discussion of the
FIFRA statutory requirements, see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
123. Nat’l Family Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1136 (summarizing EPA’s errors).
For a discussion of how the Ninth Circuit came to its conclusion, see infra notes
121-172 and accompanying text.
124. Nat’l Family Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1145 (holding EPA violated FIFRA
and vacating registration).
125. Id. at 1136-44 (reviewing EPA’s risk analysis).
126. Id. at 1136 (recognizing EPA’s risk classifications).
127. Id. at 1136-39 (finding three ways EPA understated risks).
128. See id. at 1136 (estimating if amount of dicamba tolerant seeds is underestimated, so too will be amount of dicamba used).
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report estimating that forty million acres of land will be occupied by
DT soybeans.129 The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the EPA’s
conclusion, finding this reliance improper.130 The court reasoned
that the registration decision was made in October 2018, well after
the growing season ended; therefore, the EPA could have discovered the actual amount of DT soybeans used.131 The record also
indicated that at least fifty million acres of DT soybeans were
planted.132 Based on these facts, the court found the EPA understated the amount of dicamba applied by at least twenty-five
percent.133
Next, the court examined the EPA’s conclusions regarding the
accuracy of complaints about dicamba damage.134 The EPA stated
that complaints to state departments of agriculture could have been
either “under-reported or over-reported.”135 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and found the EPA’s belief lacked substantial supporting
evidence.136 In its registration document, the EPA included data
representing the number of complaints state agriculture departments received from 2013 to 2018.137 From 2013 to 2016, annual
complaints never exceeded 1,250; however, after the OTT dicamba
registration, complaints increased sharply to three thousand in
2017 and 2,250 in 2018.138 Despite this increase, the court found
the EPA offered no explanation for the rise in drift damage
complaints.139
Instead of examining the increase in complaints, the EPA attributed the rise to an over-reporting of damages.140 The EPA admitted that many industry leaders believed the number of
129. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1136 (determining how EPA estimated
amount of dicamba tolerant seeds).
130. Id. (rejecting EPA’s estimate).
131. Id. at 1136 (challenging EPA for not creating their own estimate). By
the time the registration decision was made, the EPA had the ability to conduct an
estimate regarding the amount of DT seeds used rather than rely exclusively on
Monsanto’s estimations. See id. (claiming EPA could have estimated number of DT
seeds planted).
132. Id. (indicating actual amount of DT soybeans planted in 2018).
133. Id. at 1136-37 (approximating understatement of dicamba application).
134. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1137-38 (reviewing EPA’s conclusions).
135. Id. at 1137 (providing EPA’s belief on dicamba damage reports).
136. Id. (declining to follow EPA’s conclusions).
137. Id. (explaining data EPA used in dicamba registration document). This
data was not limited to dicamba drift damage, and instead included complaints
concerning all herbicide drift damage. Id. (qualifying complaint data).
138. Id. (identifying data EPA relied on).
139. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1137 (chastising lack of explanation
given in conditional registration decision).
140. Id. (stating EPA’s basis for registration).
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complaints were underreported, but “[o]thers believe[d] that there
may be issues of overreporting.”141 The Ninth Circuit discovered
the “others” the EPA referred to was none other than Monsanto.142
Recognizing the conflict of interest, the court was doubtful of Monsanto’s beliefs considering the questionable studies Monsanto
presented in its applications.143 A review of the evidence of dicamba damage confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s skepticism.144 The
court found multiple independent assessments that supported the
belief that dicamba damage was underreported.145 These reports
theorized that the underreporting was due in part because of a reluctance by farming communities to involve governmental
agencies.146
The EPA made no attempt to quantify the amount of damage
OTT dicamba caused, nor would it admit any damage occurred.147
In its registration decision, EPA officials declined to estimate the
damages, claiming they lacked sufficient data.148 The court rejected this notion, concluding the EPA had the requisite information to quantify dicamba damage.149 The Ninth Circuit identified
internal EPA presentations and emails, academic studies, and news
articles discussing the extent of dicamba damage.150 Based on
these sources, the court concluded the EPA possessed enough in-

141. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting EPA registration decision).
142. Id. (investigating EPA’s claims).
143. Id. (questioning EPA’s reliance on Monsanto reports). For a discussion
of the Ninth Circuit’s examination of Monsanto’s reports, see supra notes 104-116.
144. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1137-38 (reviewing third party studies
on dicamba drift damage).
145. Id. (summarizing results of outside studies on dicamba damage reporting). A professor at the University of Iowa found less than twenty-five percent of
dicamba cases were reported, and the Indiana Director of Quality Assurance estimated only ten percent of dicamba injuries were reported to her office. Id. (emphasizing industry belief in dicamba damage underreporting).
146. Id. at 1138 (hypothesizing cause of underrepresentation of dicamba
damage complaints).
147. Id. (criticizing EPA’s decision report). Although the EPA acknowledged
OTT dicamba can cause damage, it only regarded the damage as “potential.” Id.
(reviewing registration decision).
148. Id. (quoting EPA’s explanation).
149. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1138 (denying claims of lack of quantitative data).
150. Id. at 1138-39 (discovering multiple sources of quantitative damage).
The EPA’s Acting Chief of the Herbicide Branch of the Pesticide Program admitted in an internal meeting that 3.6 million acres of soybeans were damaged by
dicamba. Id. (finding EPA possessed dicamba damage data).
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formation to estimate the amount of dicamba damage that
occurred.151
2. Failure to Identify Risks
The Ninth Circuit also found the EPA failed to identify certain
risks, some of which the Agency was statutorily required to consider.152 The court identified two risks the EPA failed to consider:
(1) non-compliance with label requirements, and (2) social and economic costs.153 These errors were so substantial the court found
that it must vacate the registration.154
In 2018, the EPA added stricter label requirements for OTT
dicamba, dictating when and how it could be applied.155 The 2018
registration label specifically mandated when OTT dicamba could
be applied based on the time of day, temperature, wind speed, and
future weather conditions.156 The court, however, found it virtually
impossible to abide by the label’s requirements.157 More specifically, the court examined a study finding that even with strict adherence to the label requirements, there were only forty-seven hours
during June 2018 when OTT dicamba could be legally applied.158
The court concluded the EPA erred by not considering the diffi151. Id. at 1138 (discovering EPA could have calculated dicamba damages).
The Ninth Circuit clarified that the EPA had enough information to, at the very
least, estimate the damage even if the exact number was not possible to establish.
Id. (emphasizing exact quantity of soybean damaged was not required).
152. For a discussion of the risks the EPA failed to recognize, see infra notes
155-72 and accompanying text.
153. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1139-44 (summarizing risks EPA failed
to consider).
154. For a discussion of why the court vacated the registration, see infra notes
173-78 and accompanying text.
155. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1139-40 (discussing label requirements). There have been three increasingly restrictive OTT dicamba labels. Id.
(finding different OTT dicamba labels). The first label was included in the 2016
registration, the second label was created after dicamba damage was reported in
the 2016 growing season, and the third label was required for the 2018 registration. See id. (outlining history of OTT dicamba label); see also FINAL DICAMBA REGISTRATION DECISION, supra note 30 (requiring additional label requirements for
registration).
156. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1139-40 (listing 2018 label
requirements).
157. Id. at 1140-41 (finding broad concerns over large quantity of label restrictions). The label requirements were so onerous that farmers had difficulty
knowing when they were allowed to spray OTT dicamba. Id. (summarizing complexity of label requirements). The EPA also updated the label requirements in
2017 and 2018, making it even more difficult for farmers to comply with the law.
Id. at 1141 (highlighting labeling requirement changes over time).
158. Id. at 1141 (reviewing academic study on OTT dicamba label requirements). The EPA was aware of this study, and it was internally circulated. Id. (documenting EPA Director forwarded results of study to colleagues).
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culty presented by the label requirements and the likelihood of
non-compliance.159
Next, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the EPA considered
the “economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits” as required by FIFRA.160 The court found no evidence the EPA considered these costs.161 Instead, the court identified economic costs,
described as “virtually certain” to occur, created by the conditional
registration of dicamba.162 Particularly worrisome was the likelihood of a near market monopoly by manufacturers of DT soybeans.163 By manufacturing both OTT dicamba and DT seeds,
Monsanto would effectively force all soybean farmers to purchase its
DT soybeans to protect crops from drift damage.164 Further justifying this fear, the court found that two years after the 2016 registration of OTT dicamba, fifty percent of the U.S. soybean market used
DT seeds.165 Additionally, the court examined remarks from several industry executives and professors who were concerned about
dicamba’s effects on the marketplace.166
Next, the court reviewed various social costs the EPA failed to
consider.167 The court’s examination found “that OTT application
of dicamba herbicides has torn apart the social fabric of many farming communities.”168 Citing interviews of farmers, the court identified several farming communities strained by OTT dicamba use.169
These interviews revealed that the increasing prevalence of OTT
dicamba use pits neighbors against one another when drift damage
159. Id. at 1142 (concluding EPA should have identified label risks).
160. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1142-45 (reviewing additional risk factors); 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (determining standard of review).
161. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1142 (holding EPA failed to consider
statutorily-required factors).
162. Id. (independently reviewing potential economic costs).
163. Id. at 1142-43 (explaining how OTT dicamba registration could lead to
near monopoly).
164. See id. (outlining how OTT dicamba registration could monopolize soybean market).
165. Id. at 1142 (citing growing evidence of DT soybean seeds’ market
dominance).
166. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1142 (relying on industry experts to
support court’s conclusions). The consensus among industry experts was that
once OTT dicamba is registered and used, farmers would be forced to purchase
DT seeds to avoid drift damage to their crops. Id. (summarizing concerns of
industry).
167. Id. at 1143 (examining possible social costs).
168. Id. (underscoring negative effect on communities due to OTT dicamba
usage).
169. Id. (quoting farmers and news reports).
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occurs.170 Once plant injury has occurred, farmers and homeowners receive little to no help from the applicators of OTT dicamba,
creating anger and resentment within the community.171 In an extreme example, an argument over dicamba damage resulted in the
shooting and death of an Arkansas farmer.172
C. Remedy
After considering the above errors by the EPA, the Ninth Circuit held that no “substantial evidence” existed to support the 2018
conditional registration of OTT dicamba.173 The court agreed with
the EPA’s assessment of OTT dicamba’s benefits, but took issue
with the inadequate evaluation of its risks.174 Despite this conclusion, the EPA argued that even if it was in violation of FIFRA, the
court should remand without vacatur, leaving the registration in
place.175 Remand without vacatur, however, is offered “only in limited circumstances.”176 The Ninth Circuit did not heed the EPA’s
advice and ordered the registration of OTT dicamba to be vacated.177 In support of this decision, the court stated the flaws in
the EPA’s registration were so substantial that it was unlikely the
Agency would succeed on remand.178
V. GIMME SHELTER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In determining that the OTT dicamba registration should be
vacated, the Ninth Circuit presented an extensive and welcomed
analysis of the FIFRA requirements.179 By grounding its conclusion
in both the economic and social risks the EPA failed to consider,
the court endorsed a holistic approach to the FIFRA obligations
170. Id. (displaying how disagreements originate).
171. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1143 (showing how disputes can arise
from OTT dicamba use).
172. Id. (noting physical attacks resulting from dicamba use).
173. Id. at 1144 (holding EPA violated FIFRA).
174. Id. (explaining court’s reasoning behind holding).
175. Id. (presenting EPA’s argument on appropriate remedy); Brief of EPA,
supra note 36, at *73-76 (arguing appropriate remedy is remand without vacatur).
176. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Pollinator Stewardship
Council v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015)) (reinforcing
that vacating registration is usual remedy).
177. Id. at 1145 (holding correct remedy is to vacate 2018 registration of OTT
dicamba).
178. Id. (supporting decision to vacate registration).
179. For a discussion of how the court evaluated whether the OTT dicamba
registration satisfied FIFRA, see supra notes 85-172 and accompanying text.
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and deemphasized economic benefits flowing to manufacturers.180
A downside to this approach is that although the court went to
great lengths to discuss the data the EPA submitted, it did not define what “satisfactory data” means in the context of FIFRA.181
Although courts are growing stricter with FIFRA requirements,
there have been no efforts to interpret what is needed to submit
“satisfactory data.”182 The conclusions in both Pollinator and National Resource Defense Team were based in part on insufficient data,
but the courts failed to define what constitutes satisfactory data.183
This pattern continued in National Family Farm Coalition when the
Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the issue of “satisfactory data” despite the opportunity to clarify this statutory requirement.184 In its
2018 registration, the EPA relied on faulty studies, presented few
additional studies, and ignored data from impartial third parties
showing extensive OTT dicamba damage.185 Furthermore, the EPA
ignored the dramatic increase in incident reports based largely on
Monsanto’s objections.186 The court emphasized these weaknesses
by concluding Monsanto’s data was flawed, yet the court still refused to make a definitive statement on the matter.187 By clarifying
what “satisfactory data” entails, the Ninth Circuit could have proactively worked toward ensuring proposed pesticides have a limited
chance of harming the environment.188
At the very least, this case presented the Ninth Circuit with a
perfect opportunity to encourage the use of independent studies to
180. For a discussion of the risks the EPA did not consider, see supra notes
155-72 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the court’s analysis of the data the EPA relied on to
grant conditional registration of OTT dicamba, see supra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of previous case law interpreting FIFRA, see supra notes
63-81 and accompanying text.
183. For a discussion summarizing prior judicial interpretation of FIFRA, see
supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of why the Ninth Circuit did not make a determination
regarding the data the EPA relied on, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the field studies the EPA cited in its 2018 registration
and the court’s critical analysis of these studies, see supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the EPA’s indifference
towards the increased incident reports, see supra notes 104-16 and accompanying
text.
187. See Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1124
(9th Cir. 2020) (concluding EPA’s data was flawed).
188. For a discussion of the harms resulting from the OTT dicamba registration, see supra notes 119, 205 and accompanying text.
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supplement industry reports.189 The EPA relied heavily on studies
produced by OTT dicamba manufacturers, while largely ignoring
independent third party studies showing extensive drift damage.190
A statement by the court encouraging or even requiring the use of
independent studies would decrease reliance on manufacturers
with inherent conflicts of interest.191 In National Family Farm Coalition, utilizing third-party data would have forced the EPA to confront the mountain of evidence that directly conflicted with
Monsanto’s belief that the volatility of OTT dicamba was not an
issue.192
Additionally, had the Ninth Circuit ruled on the type of data
needed for conditional registration, this would have provided pesticide manufacturers with valuable guidance for their research and
development departments.193 Many of the issues prevalent in the
OTT dicamba application resulted from Monsanto’s inadequate
testing.194 If prior courts had identified the scope of “satisfactory
data,” Monsanto could have evaluated the sufficiency and completeness of its studies before submitting its application.195 As a result,
Monsanto may have been able to identify and remove deficiencies
prior to submission, resulting in more adequate data presented to
the EPA.196 By setting a standard for sufficient data, courts could
incentivize improvements in pesticide safety by encouraging manufacturers to refine their products to protect the environment
adequately.197
Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s examination of FIFRA should be
applauded for ensuring the EPA follows all of the statutory require-

189. For a discussion of the data the EPA relied on, see supra notes 88-116
and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of independent reports and studies on OTT dicamba
damage, see supra notes 101-03, 145 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of the benefits of confirming industry studies with independent data, see supra notes 101-03, 145 and accompanying text.
192. For a discussion comparing independent studies to Monsanto data, see
supra notes 101-03, 145 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of the studies Monsanto provided to the EPA, see supra
88-99 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the data Monsanto provided to the EPA, see supra 8899 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to why it did not
define “satisfactory data,” see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the data Monsanto provided to the EPA, see supra 8899 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of FIFRA’s intent, see supra notes 49 and accompanying
text.
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ments.198 Considering the current state of the conditional registration framework, however, it would have been beneficial for the
court to elaborate on what type of data is satisfactory.199 Conditional registrations have been used far more frequently than Congress intended, and sufficient oversight is lacking.200 Conditional
registrations permit the use of thousands of pesticides, and if the
EPA’s normal standard of review is anything similar to the OTT
dicamba application, the resulting environmental harm could be
significant.201 In light of this and the lesser statutory requirements
conditional registrations must follow, it is critical that courts strictly
apply FIFRA requirements when the EPA fails to do so.202
VI. THE WIND CRIES MARY: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL FAMILY
FARM COALITION ON FUTURE LITIGANTS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in National Family Farm Coalition
forced the EPA to bar future sales of OTT dicamba.203 This decision could not come fast enough considering the widespread damage OTT dicamba caused.204 Examining only eighteen of the
thirty-four states that use OTT dicamba, the most recent estimate
from mid-2018 approximates that 1.1 million acres of soybeans
were damaged.205 The Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the OTT
dicamba registration ended this dangerous use, providing farmers
with a reprieve from its noxious effects.206
OTT dicamba manufacturers were not deterred from the
court’s rebuke; Monsanto quickly applied for new registrations and
in October 2020, the EPA shockingly granted nonconditional regis198. For the Ninth Circuit’s holding regarding the FIFRA claim, see supra
notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the conditional registration system, see supra notes
59-62 and accompanying text.
200. Lau, supra note 59 (finding Congress intended conditional registrations
to be used sparingly).
201. GAO REPORT, supra note 60 (estimating amount of conditionally registered pesticides granted).
202. For a discussion of the requirements of conditional registrations versus
nonconditional registrations, see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of the remedy the Ninth Circuit implemented, see supra
notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
204. See Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1128
(9th Cir. 2020) (summarizing damage during 2018 growing season).
205. Id. (estimating amount of damage midway through 2018 growing
season).
206. For a discussion of the incident reports of dicamba damage the court
examined, see supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
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tration of OTT dicamba use for a term of five years.207 The National
Family Farm Coalition decision only pertains to the 2018 conditional
registration, so the EPA still had full authority to register future applications it deemed acceptable.208 This decision is astonishing
considering the stricter nonconditional registration standards and
the Ninth Circuit’s finding that it was unlikely Monsanto could acquire satisfactory data to fix the issues with the 2018 conditional
registration.209 Further complicating the issue, the EPA granted
the nonconditional approval just six days before the 2020 presidential election, raising fears of undue political influence.210 An Inspector General Report confirmed these fears, finding the 2018
nonconditional dicamba registration strayed from EPA protocols
and was a result of political influence.211
Despite the subsequent nonconditional registration, the National Family Farm Coalition decision can still have a profound impact
on future pesticide litigation.212 First, the Ninth Circuit’s meticulous approach in writing its opinion will serve as an example to future courts.213 The NFFC has already challenged the 2020
nonconditional registration.214 The reviewing court can use the
207. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-2020-0492, MEMORANDUM SUPPORTDECISION TO APPROVE REGISTRATION FOR THE USES OF DICAMBA ON DICAMBA
TOLERANT COTTON AND SOYBEAN (Oct. 27, 2020) (approving nonconditional
registration).
208. For a discussion of the scope of the National Family Farm Coalition lawsuit,
see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of nonconditional registration, see supra notes 52-58
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s perspective on
future OTT dicamba applications, see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
210. See infra note 211 (noting political interference). The EPA Administrator under the Trump Administration, Scott Wheeler, criticized the Ninth Circuit’s
decision for threatening the livelihood of farmers and the global food supply.
Jonathon Hettinger, In Apparent Rejection of Federal Court, EPA Allows Continued Dicamba Use, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (June 9, 2020), https://
investigatemidwest.org/2020/06/09/in-apparent-rejection-of-federal-court-epa-allows-continued-dicamba-use/ (reporting fallout of National Family Farm Coalition
decision).
211. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 21-E-0146,
EPA DEVIATED FROM TYPICAL PROCEDURE IN ITS 2018 DICAMBA PESTICIDE REGISTRATION DECISION, 9-11 (May 24, 2014) (investigating EPA’s dicamba registration).
The Inspector General Report specifically cited an internal email stating the 2018
registration decision was an example of when “political interference sometimes
compromised the integrity of our science.” Id. at 21-22 (finding internal belief
from EPA of political influence in dicamba registration).
212. For a discussion of the 2020 nonconditional OTT dicamba registration,
see supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
213. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s examination of FIFRA in National
Family Farm Coalition, see supra notes 82-172 and accompanying text.
214. Petition for Review at 2, Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. et al. v. U.S. Env’t Prot.
Agency, 960 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-73750), https://aglaw.psu.edu/wpING
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National Family Farm Coalition decision to assess whether the nonconditional registration took the appropriate steps to cure the 2018
registration’s deficiencies.215 If the Ninth Circuit’s prediction is
correct, then the 2020 nonconditional registration has little hope of
surviving.216
Second, the National Family Farm Coalition decision continues in
a line of cases reinforcing the statutory requirements of FIFRA.217
The EPA overuses conditional registrations and lacks appropriate
oversight; despite these problems, courts have yet to intervene and
correct these issues.218 Activists have historically found FIFRA
claims hard to win when challenging a pesticide the EPA has registered.219 The Ninth Circuit’s holding provides hope that courts will
support activists’ interests when the EPA fails to evaluate potentially
harmful pesticides.220 Moreover, if courts continue in the footsteps
of National Family Farm Coalition, similar holdings will influence the
EPA to apply stricter oversight of conditional registrations, keeping
in line with Congress’ intent.221
Finally, the risks the Ninth Circuit identified as being ignored
provide novel factors for the EPA to consider.222 FIFRA requires
the EPA to evaluate environmental costs against the potentially vast
economic benefits.223 The court looked beyond potential costs and
benefits to farmers and manufacturers alone, criticizing the EPA for
ignoring the impact the registration could have on the market as a
content/uploads/2021/03/NFFC-v.-EPA-2nd-lawsuit-12.21.20-Petition-for-Review.pdf (requesting nonconditional registration to be vacated).
215. For a discussion of the errors in the 2018 registration, see supra notes
121-72 and accompanying text.
216. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120, 1145
(9th Cir. 2020) (predicting failure for application on remand).
217. For a discussion of prior case law enforcing FIFRA, see supra notes 63-81
and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the original intent of FIFRA and its oversight, see
supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
219. Jonathon Hettinger, Controversial Herbicide Dicamba no Longer Legal, Federal Court Rules, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (June 3, 2020), https:/
/investigatemidwest.org/2020/06/03/controversial-herbicide-dicamba-no-longerlegal-federal-court-rules/ (describing state of FIFRA).
220. For a discussion of the EPA’s improprieties when granting the 2018 conditional registration, see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the original intent of conditional registration, see
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the risks the EPA failed to identify, see supra notes
152-72 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the standards of FIFRA, see supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the economic value of soybean farming in
the United States, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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whole.224 By reducing the emphasis on individual economic effects, courts can help mitigate potential market monopolies in the
future while appropriately grounding the analysis in FIFRA’s central focus — environmental protection.225 Similarly, judicial focus
on social costs will ensure that this part of FIFRA is not ignored in
future cases.226 As the Ninth Circuit’s opinion explains, the effects
of pesticide use are not limited to the four corners of a farm.227
Focusing on this issue forces the EPA to consider the real harms
communities face when the Agency fails to identify environmental
risks.228 Ideally, National Family Farm Coalition and future FIFRA decisions will ensure the EPA takes all of FIFRA’s statutory requirements into account before it grants pesticide registrations.229
Timothy Keith*
224. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s examination of the market forces,
see supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
225. For a discussion of the formation of market monopolies, see supra notes
163-65 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of the FIFRA requirement mandating a review of the
social costs and benefits, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
227. For a discussion of additional harms OTT dicamba registration causes,
see supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
228. For a discussion of the social harms that occurred after OTT dicamba
registration, see supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
229. For a discussion of the factors the EPA failed to consider, see supra notes
152-72 and accompanying text.
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